The Current Situation in the Balkans and the Internal Relations

di Stefan Vucic - 23 Aprile 2019

  from Stockholm, Sweden

   DOI: 10.48256/TDM2012_00032

THE CONTEXT – CURRENT SITUATION IN THE BALKANS AND INTERNAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE REGION

In geographical terms the region of the Western Balkans is part of South-eastern Europe facing the Adriatic Sea towards west. It consists of the states and entities which followed the breakdown of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and Albania. In this very instance, in addition to Albania, the analysis will cover territorial units within which major world and regional powers tend to exert their influence, i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Among those, Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities: 1) the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 2) the Republic of Srpska, and both have each their own government. Despite the fact that such an organisational structure of the state is constitutional, it often reveals the discord between the entities and alludes to the dysfunctionality of the state.

 

Furthermore, Kosovo declared unilaterally its independence from Serbia in 2008. Forasmuch as Serbia formally still claims it as its southern province, Kosovo has not managed to secure full international recognition of its independence yet. Being supported by the most influential actors in the West, it manages nonetheless to govern its affairs rather independently and, for the time being, often contrary from the government in Belgrade. The Kosovo-issue may be considered as the major and the most unsettled question in that area. Howbeit, what is even more important to consider in this case is that any resolution of that very problem may also affect the current power balance and structure of the region.

 

THE BASIS FOR FOREIGN PRESENCE

The importance of the region in geostrategic terms and the actual arrangement among its internal actors provide a favourable environment for justifying the need for foreign presence in form of intensified diplomatic activities. Simultaneously, it also provides a responsive ground for exerting their influence within specific groups. External actors observing the processes in the region repeatedly note that any agreement which is acceptable for both parties in any of the open disputes would be also acceptable for them. However, it is likewise being followed by a specific conditional remark, depending on from which side it comes – it has to be in accordance with certain principles, e.g. either with European values, or with international law, or by respecting the already established reality of the situation. Those conditional remarks are the principles which safeguard the interests of each external actor in the given context.

 

HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVE

Historically, the Western interest was reflected in the aspirations of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic. Today such a role is primarily assumed by the US and the EU. Russia has had for many centuries a strategic ambition for gaining access to the warm water ports, in this instance meaning the Adriatic Sea. Thus, there may be noticed a long-standing competition between Russia and the West, both in pre- and post-Cold War era, for deterring each other from obtaining a total control of that geostrategic position.

The West has been generally performing with the US and the EU acting in concordance. Since recently though, precisely with the new Republican administration in the US, their activities allude to somewhat more individualistic approach in this context. Turkey had managed to maintain a long historical presence in the region during the period of Ottoman rule. Today, despite being rather limited by the previously mentioned actors, as a regional power it uses every opportunity to remind that it is closely following the events in the region. Among all those there is China which may be considered a new actor and which does not bear any historical burden relating to the region.

 

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SOFT POWER MECHANISM

Current official strategic determination of all countries in the region is the integration into the structures of the European Union. This puts the EU in a privileged position among the other powers interested in the region. However, by taking into consideration the nature of the EU-Western Balkans relations more carefully, it may be argued that the relationship is not necessarily exempted from any complexities. Fundamentally, it is reasonable to believe that the EU enlargement strategy referring to the Western Balkans (EU Commission, 2018), and the ambition of the said countries to join the EU, reflects a common interest of the both parties based on the principle of mutual gains, on the one hand. On the other, the EU also considers its Enlargement policy as a soft power mechanism.

Through the process of establishing its institutions, values and norms, it makes the state naturally to align its strategic interests in accordance to the interests of the EU. Considering that the respective country does that technically willingly, it presents a very soft but effective way of influencing a country’s strategic determination. If this is perceived from a more realist perspective, it can be claimed that the Enlargement policy is a diplomatic strategy which the EU uses in order to exert its influence outside of its borders. By enacting its normative aspect and legislation, the EU strengthens its influencing position in that country.

 

THE EU–WB RELATIONSHIP: TO BE, OR NOT TO BE?

The major peculiarity of such a relationship is that it is still unpredictable when, and even whether at all, the Western Balkan countries may fully become part of the EU. There are still many problematical aspects, such as rule of law, corruption, organised crime (Ibid.), and unsettled intra-regional issues. It altogether reflects unreadiness of these countries, as such, to join the EU, forasmuch as it would only add to the EU’s existing internal problems. According to the statement from 2017 made by the current president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, that “our Union must be stronger and more solid, before it can be bigger” (Ibid.) it is evident that the enlargement is not the priority.

 

It became even more clear at EU-Western Balkans Summit in Sofia in 2018 when French president Emmanuel Macron associated previous enlargement with the weakening of the Union. Thus, he was above all suggesting a more rigorous criteria for those intending to join in future (Gray, 2018). The interpretation of such messages in the public has weakened the position of the EU in the region and its negotiating authority. Even more so if it is perceived together with the EU’s internal challenges, e.g. Brexit. In this aspect, the EU demonstrates its disadvantage when it comes to bargaining being a complex system instead of a single unit.

 

THE US IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC CONTEXT – PAX AMERICANA

The United States entered the region rather assertively, both by means of diplomacy and militarily, during the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. As such, the US may be considered as the main guarantor of the existent post-war order. Since then it has kept its diplomatic activities in the region mainly in concordance with the European Union. Their common interest is fundamentally seeing the Western Balkans engaged in the EU integrations and even more in the integration within the NATO structures. Despite being the major supporter of Kosovo’s independence and thus of the Albanian interests in the region, the current Republican US administration postures itself in a seemingly impartial position. The earlier Democrat administration considered many issues as already solved, leaving to the parties in the dispute only a possibility to accept the provisioned solutions.

 

A REVISED US STRATEGY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

The current US approach allegedly leaves more freedom to the parties to come to the solution which they would create themselves, adding that they will support such an agreement if it is acceptable for both parties (UN Press, 2018). Such an attitude may also additionally soften the official position which Serbia has concerning the Kosovo-status issue. By presenting a deal in which Serbia may feel as if it is gaining something out of the potential agreement, instead of merely giving up even the elements which it has managed formally to retain in Kosovo, it is more likely that an agreement may be reached.

Furthermore, the US interest is that the Kosovo issue may get solved at the earliest opportunity (Associated Press, 2018). The reason for that is that the status quo leaves more space for Russia to exert its influence in Serbia considering that Russia is one of the most efficient tools which Serbia currently may use when it comes to protecting its interests internationally. This does not only lead to alignment of interests of the two respective countries but also leaves limited space for other influences.

 

RUSSIA’S TRADITIONAL AND SOLID PRESENCE

The major channel through which Russia reaches its target groups in the Western Balkans and exerts its soft power is the constructivist aspect. This is based in the common Slavic cultural heritage and even more because it is amplified by the same religious affiliation, i.e. through the Eastern Orthodox Church. It may suggest a rather traditional context of partnership. Nonetheless, it may also be the reason why it is a rather constant relationship with a lasting and resistant basis, which appears to be an option whenever other partnerships are at risk of ending up in a distrust. Even though the nature of the relationship is not directly political, it provides solid conditions for exerting influence in a political context. This indicates the possibility that whenever some other external power with a stronger influencing potential retreats from the region, it leaves space for more of Russian influence as a reasonable consequence.

 

Beside the constructivist element, the relations between Russia and Serbia possess a very clear pragmatic character. It is primarily reflected in the example of the Russian support of Serbia in the United Nations Security Council to the extent that Russia technically represents Serbian national interests in the post-Yugoslavian regional disputes. On the one hand this may seem to be of a great value, but, on the other, raises another set of concerns. Namely, in this manner the interests of the two countries are getting aligned, whereas it is reasonable that the interests of the smaller country will align to the interests of the disproportionally larger one. It follows that the smaller country may have issues to identify and define its own, authentic, interests. This is especially contradictory if perceived in the light of the EU accession negotiations where Serbia attempts to play a double game and pretend to act neutral.

 

CHINA’S UNCONDITIONAL INVESTMENTS

China, being an emerging power at a global level, is entering the region of the Western Balkans rather in the same way as it is entering any other region worldwide where the circumstances allow it. Unlike the other mentioned external powers in the region, China is the only one there that does not have any traditional and established record of presence. Moreover, it has neither any constructivist basis upon which any solid relationship may be built upon. As a result of not having such a burden concerning this very region, it often appears as a preferable choice for business partnership. This is foremost due to assuming that it seemingly does not imply any political conditions, which would generally exist in case of cooperation with other powers.

 

Therefore, the most prevalent form of Chinese soft power may be found in form of ‘unconditional’ investments, or ‘development aids’ as they are also known in Africa (Dove, 2016). This again raises concerns within the Euro-Atlantic block. All those Western Balkan countries which have an established cooperation with China in the given form may also become part of the EU structures at some point in future. Such a scenario alludes to the term of Chinese ‘Trojan horse(s)’. Even though that any investments contributing to the regional development can be most fundamentally considered as good, this form of cooperation does not fully correspond with the official strategic determination of the said countries, and for justifiable reasons is considered as problematic from the Euro-Atlantic Perspective (Heath and Gray, 2018).

 

TURKEY IN A CONSTANT AND SUBTLE PROXIMITY

Although Turkey cannot be considered as a power at the same level as the other mentioned actors, it is still a regional power with historical interests in the region. In a similar way as Russia though, Turkey can also rely on the constructivist aspect which enables it to exert its influence within specific target groups. It may be argued that it is foremost based on the religious aspect, i.e. through the Islamic community. However, it should be considered only as part of the whole cultural aspect which is the heritage of Turkish presence in the region from the Ottoman period. Such a basis can especially be found in certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Kosovo and Albania.

 

The power of Turkey and its influence in the region may be limited by the other present actors. Nonetheless, the peculiarity of the relations which Turkey currently has with its NATO allies and with Russia at the same time, places it in a very favourable position for manoeuvring and bargaining with its interests. Thus, it is not unlikely that at some point one of the powers may give up some of its space in the region on the behalf of Turkey if it happened to offer in return a good deal in a region of a greater priority.

 

PREDICTABLE EPILOGUES

Same as on global level, so can be said also for the Western Balkans, that the Euro-Atlantic block has slightly lost its momentum due to the rise of China globally and increased Russian activities out of its borders. To this can be added the internal challenges in the EU as well as the altered approach of Trump’s administration concerning the international matters. However, NATO still seem to be achieving its goals in the region, e.g. by integrating Montenegro and Macedonia within its structures. These, some argue, could actually be the weakest spots of NATO. By integrating a militarily weak country which, in addition to that, has rather strong ties with Russia from the constructivist perspective, NATO becomes rather more vulnerable from inside than competitive at an executive level (Stacey, 2018).

 

The region has also experienced a decreasing international interest in general terms during the latest years. A lower intensity of foreign influences could also minimise the risks for a conflict between the respective spheres through which different interests are being expressed on the regional level. However, this would be only reliable under the condition that all the problems have been solved prior to that, which is rather unlikely to happen in such a complex environment. Thus, as long as there are ongoing issues, there will be space, by many deemed as a necessity, for the presence of external powers. Accordingly, considering that the influences come from various and often opposing sides, it makes the region also very dependent on the balance of powers at the global level.

 

Sources:

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Stefan Vucic is the author of this article. He is currently based in Stockholm, Sweden, and is reading politics and International Relations.

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