from Stockholm, Sweden
How do we formulate information warfare?
In the simplest terms, the following text will consider information warfare as a matter of representation. What constitutes a ‘warfare’ of this sort is the conflictual relationship of the representations of the self-image and of the image of the ‘other’. The two key concepts which will assist understanding this matter are those of strategic culture and of securitisation. Information warfare concerns the matters of security, or more precisely, it is a matter of perceptions on security issues. As Molander et al. argued already back in 1996, “[n]ew information-based techniques may substantially increase the power of deception and of image-manipulation activities, dramatically complicating government efforts to build political support for security-related initiatives”.
The representation of the self-image is reflected through developing a strategic culture. Strategic culture is based on a common understanding of security within a community (e.g. state, alliance, etc). It also implies identifying a clear view on the mission of ‘the self’ within the security milieu on a global scale. The representation of the image of ‘the other’ may be found in the innuendo of one’s strategic culture. Most often though it is being directly expressed through representing certain discourses by the means of mass communication. This is the case when a certain issue is being securitised, i.e. it is being framed as a threat.
The utility of post-structuralist dimension of information warfare
The underlying motives for actors to engage into information warfare are often very complex, but they are always directly connected to their realist interests. What reflects the utility of such activities is found in the chances that actors may leverage their own and depreciate the other’s positions in the area of international relations. Hence what matters for all actors is to manage to maintain their positions at the highest possible level. In exceptional case, it would be of strategic significance if an actual conflict would take place. More often though, it matters because it can secure a more favourable bargaining position when it comes to actor’s interests in the area of global affairs.
On the internal level, it is based on upholding the faith of the community in the values for which the state (or a wider entity, e.g. a union or an alliance) stands for. In addition to that, it is supposed to enable and legitimise certain agencies which the entity is interested in taking part in on international level.
Information warfare hence may be regarded as an in-textual conflict which is being managed in its post-structuralist dimension. It exhibits how important the post-structuralist dimension of a conflict may be when it comes to the strategy in case of an actual conflict in the field. The main challenge is however to discern the complexity of information warfare activities. They may seem rather straightforward and simple at surface, but they are too often, if not always, part of a double game. Therefore, in tracing what is the purpose of certain forms of information warfare, the priority is ought to be given to identifying what agencies those discourses enable instead of what their texts claim.
How does it work – information and discourse?
The efficiency of information warfare is found indeed in their ambiguity once one tries to analyse the texts used for that purpose. It means that those texts that are being communicated to public as part of information warfare are best understandable if the reader does not go beyond their surface. They are framed thus so that they make sense only if the reader follows the ‘intended reading’ of it, that is if the reader accepts the intended message. The intended message of such texts asks for a specific reaction from the reader which is in conformity with the strategic culture of the entity which presents the said text.
However, analysing this issue through the method Derridean deconstruction opens a whole new perspective on such activities. A specific representation of an event, or a process, suggests that the context in which the text is being read will determine the aimed implication of such reading. It is based on invoking previous experiences which are consisted in the content of the words which comprise the text. Those words bear in themselves certain possibilities. The process of reading assigns specific meanings to those expressions by applying a specific judgemental criterion imposed by the context in which the text is being read.
It is a process of framing a specific representation out of the information on the event, whose reading, that is understanding of the event, provokes certain reactions. Calling events by different names, i.e. assigning them certain meanings, invokes the content of such meanings in form of agencies. Therefore, the inevitable set of questions which is being asked in that case is: 1) Who establishes such a discourse? 2) What such a discourse enables in terms of agencies (reactions)? 3) Why a certain discourse prevails over the other?
Strategic culture and information warfare
The concept of strategic culture may be most concisely defined as ‘security policy habits of mind’ of a certain community (Skak, 2016). It is built upon the self-image and upon the idea of how the community understands its mission in the world of international relations. Strategic culture is manifested through a recognisable pattern of behaviour which is “…specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience” (Gray, 1999). Although being persistent, it is being constantly reframed as a socially constructed phaenomenon as part of framing of the ‘self’. The said property is indeed the one which is subject to the operations assumed by information warfare activities.
Firstly, the process of framing of the ‘self’ imposes the idea of what is normal and acceptable. It means that the image of the ‘self’ is generally taken as the criterion of truth when assessing the ‘other’. The ‘other’ is hence not necessarily regarded as an enemy as long as its behaviour is not being perceived as threatening to the values which comprise the strategic culture of the ‘self’. It follows that the said relationship between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ is a matter of perception management done through representing information through interest-driven discourses. Information warfare in this context has a dual function. One is external which aims to influence the ‘other’ in order to minimise its threatening potential. The other has internal purpose reflected in reinforcing the faith of domestic public in the institutions, but also in seeking legitimacy for unpopular security-related activities.
5 Securitisation
An example of obtaining legitimacy for certain security-related measures or activities can be manifested through the process of ‘securitisation’. According to the Copenhagen Security School, there are no things out there which are naturally security issues and those that are not (Buzan, 1998). Issues become matters of security through speech acts. By naming certain things ‘security problems’, the community chose to deal with those things in a particular way (Ibid.). The consequence of such naming is that it requires an immediate agency to treat it as a necessity. Here, the securitisation agency is being created through naming, that is by assigning a specific meaning to it. One of securitisation’s key points which Lene Hansen (2011) emphasises is “…that ‘security’ is constituted through a particular discursive modality, namely that of threats and dangers calling for radical measures in defense of one’s survival”.
The key in this case is the audience which needs to be convinced that the securitised issue is a matter of urgency. However, the case is that a formal approval from the public is not needed because the process of securitisation implies de-democratisation of the issue (Herborth, 2017). What is being imposed as an existential threat calls for an emergency and the issue is no longer under public domain but under the jurisdiction of security offices. It is not expected to be set up for a public debate, but it has to be handled immediately. Eriksson (2001) calls this ‘framing’ of a threat. He considers it to be a contest over imposing specific meanings to the issues that are subject to perceptual, interpretative and representative characterisation within a community. It would not only identify what is to be regarded a security issue, but also propose how it should be handled.
The understanding of modern warfare
All the mentioned forms of information warfare activities may be considered as part of what is referred to as modern warfare. Clausewitz (2008) conceived warfare as “…not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means”. Unlike in this traditional understanding of war, the character of modern warfare is such that policy has become one of the main means of warfare. An example of it is ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ published in 2013 as “The Value of Science is in the Foresight” by Russia’s chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov. The main property of that text is that it points out that “[t]he role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness” (Gerasimov, 2013/2016).
The new set of rules of warfare alludes to the paradigm of Odysseus’ Trojan horse strategy. It means that hacking an enemy’s society by non-military means is more efficient than directly confronting it (McKew, 2017). Information warfare is hence primarily focused on manipulating information and thus managing perceptions on political issues that may be subject to policymaking processes. In simplified terms, it is an attempt to influence the strategic culture of the ‘other’, that is to reshape its understanding of the ‘self’. The party which exerts such influence aims to create an environment in which its interests and activities would not be perceived as a threat by others.
Today’s actors’ approaches to information warfare
Giles (2016) in “Handbook of Russian Information Warfare” made for NATO Defense College, examined the implications of being able to control the information of the ‘other’. He emphasised one of remarks made by Russia’s major-general Vladimir Slipchenko, which is that “Winning information confrontations will result in the achievement of strategic and political goals and in the defeat of an enemy’s armed forces (and the capture of his territory, destruction of his economic potential, and overthrow of his political system)”.
In the United States, Russia’s activities which may be categorised as information warfare are generally described as “…designed to sow discord inside the United States, create fissures between Washington and its allies, undermine U.S. influence around the world, and increase Russia’s power and influence” (Jones, 2018). China’s activities are for the time being more focused on its surroundings in the Far East, but to some lesser extent also in the US. China’s approach, according to Burton (2019), is mirrored in the fact that “Beijing has been able to set the terms of debate, and once you can set the terms of debate…, if you’re asking the questions, then you’re able to drive intellectuals or policymakers to a certain answer”.
Considering its dominating global position, the West has been for decades in the position to promote the discourse of ‘universal values’. By naming them ‘universal’, the barrier between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ has been subtly dissolved, which has secured a favourable position from which it can exert its soft power. The critical viewpoint would however emphasise the controversy of the West’s efforts to impose its own values as ‘universal values’ to others. It is represented as an attempt of reshaping of the understanding of the other’s ‘self’ and thus of its strategic culture and behaviour in conformity with the Western habits.
Why does it work – effects and why it matters?
Security policymaking is primarily determined by ‘consensual knowledge’, i.e. it is based on the problems that are considered as factual within a community (Smith, 2017). However, it is impossible to draw a hard line between ‘consensual knowledge’ and ’contested knowledge’ which is based on meanings and values. It is because these two categories overlap each other in a significant part, which thence makes them interdependent (Ibid.).
When an external actor manages to impact information flows of a certain community in a non-benevolent way, it is in a good position to influence the ‘contested knowledge’. There is then a high risk that it would affect the authority of ‘consensual knowledge’ too. For example, reframed values of a certain group which can comprise a critical mass within a society are brought into opposition to the values of institutions. It is a moment of crisis in which the state perceives its own citizens as a security threat. If it fails to deescalate the crisis in a subtle manner, it risks inciting a revolution by the said critical mass. This has indeed been plausible rather in the societies with weaker institutions. However, considering that modern technologies make the current information systems more vulnerable, even the well-established states are challenged to handle these sorts of threats.
The information warfare dimension of security is predominantly based on perceptual games which may have serious consequences. The way a certain community sees themselves is a matter of identity, but also crucial for security. How that community decides to represent themselves to others determines how the others will act having taken their representation into account. It is a subtle way of influencing the other’s grand strategy by making that ‘other’ to consider presence and interests of the said community as reflected in their strategic culture.
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*Stefan Vucic is the author of this article. He is currently based in Stockholm, Sweden, and is reading Politics and International Relations.
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